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Prime Minister Narendra Modi will leave for Bali on November 14 to attend the G20 summit on November 15-16. Food and energy security, and post-COVID-19 health issues will be at the top of the agenda in sessions at the summit in the Indonesian city.
Officials said that during the visit, Mr. Modi will meet with “several” G20 leaders but wouldn’t confirm which ones. He will also address the Indian community in Bali, and visit a mangrove forest. Mr. Modi will also use the opportunity to invite all other G20 leaders to the next summit due to be held in India in September 2023.
This G20 summit is particularly special because India will hold the presidency of the G-20 summit from December 1, 2022 for a one-year period, and the presidency handover will take place during the summit in Bali.
Mr. Modi will discuss plans for India’s presidency of the G20, including environment and gender issues and a “greater voice for the global south in issues of international economic cooperation, [and] the need for reformed 21st century institutions”.
When asked about the possibility of Mr. Modi meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping or Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who had to cancel his visit to India at the last minute due to “scheduling difficulties. This is something which remains under evolution.”
Ahead of a possible meeting between Mr. Modi and U.S. President Joseph Biden, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met in Cambodia on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit (EAS), and discussed the war in Ukraine, Indo-Pacific strategy, energy issues, the G20 and Indo-U.S. bilateral relations.
The U.S. supports India’s G20 presidency,” Mr. Blinken said in a tweet, adding that their discussions focussed on “ongoing efforts to expand our partnership & mitigate the effects of Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Mr. Modi will reach Bali on Monday evening, skipping the B-20 business forum being concluded that day at which Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will give keynote addresses and several global business leaders, including Twitter head Elon Musk, will speak.
City
POCSO is not meant to criminalise consensual relationships,observes high court (Page no. 2)
(GS Paper 2, Polity and Governance)
The Delhi High Court has remarked that the intention of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act was to protect children below the age of 18 from sexual exploitation and that it was never meant to criminalise consensual romantic relationships between young adults.
The observation was made by Justice Jasmeet Singh while granting bail to a young man, who was arrested by the Delhi Police, based on an FIR filed by the father of a minor girl who accused him of raping and kidnapping his 17-year-old daughter with intent to compel her to marriage.
The young man had moved the court for bail, stating that he had been in custody since December 31, 2021.His counsel argued before the court that this is a case where the girl came with the young man out of her own will.
The counsel said on October 27 the girl came to the house of the man and the next day they went to Punjab and got married. The counsel further said that the girl had last year approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana stating that she had married the young man out of her own will.
Subsequently, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana had directed the police to provide adequate and appropriate protection to the girl and her husband.
Taking note of the submission, Justice Singh said, In my opinion, the intention of POCSO was to protect children below the age of 18 years from sexual exploitation. It was never meant to criminalise consensual romantic relationships between young adults.
However, this has to be seen from facts and circumstances of each case. There might be cases where the survivor of sexual offence, may under pressure or trauma be forced to settle.
Justice Singh said he interacted with the girl in the chamber in the presence of public prosecutor and she told him that at the time of her marriage, she was 17 years of age.
She also told the judge that she got married of her own free will, without any undue influence, threat, pressure or coercion and even today wants to stay with him.
Editorial
Behind the smokescreen around private climate finance (Page no. 6)
(GS Paper 3, Environment)
Over the last few years, developed countries have insisted upon two points on the issue of climate finance. First, they maintain that their commitment to reaching the target of $100 billion in climate finance a year for developing countries, first promised in 2009, is close to being met.
Second, they view the mobilisation of private finance as the critical component of climate finance henceforth. John Kerry, the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change, and Mark Carney, the current UN Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance and former Governor of the Bank of England, are the leading proponents of this view.
On several occasions, Mr. Kerry has said that the private sector can find solutions to climate change by funding the trillions needed for a global transition to clean energy.
Mr. Carney has called for turning billions in public capital into trillions in private capital by scaling blended finance, catalysing stand-alone private capital flows, and building new markets.
For developing countries to shape their policies based on these optimistic views is clearly challenging. How should developing countries respond to this?
Shortly before the ongoing 27th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) began in Egypt on November 6, 2022, the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) released a report on the progress made by developed countries towards achieving the goal of mobilising $100 billion per year.
The report makes two things clear — while estimates vary, it is widely accepted that the $100 billion goal has not been achieved in 2020, and an earlier effort to mobilise private finance by the developed countries has met with comprehensive failure.
The SCF report relied mainly on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Oxfam reports for aggregate climate finance trends.
The OECD report claims that developed countries have mobilised $83.3 billion in climate finance in 2020 ($68.3 billion in public finance, $13.1 billion in mobilised private finance and $1.9 billion in export credits).
The latest Oxfam report challenges this figure with the claim that the actual value of the OECD-claimed climate assistance of $83.3 billion is only around $21–$24.5 billion.
The Oxfam values are much lower as it discounts for the climate relevance of reported funds (that is funds actually targetting climate action) and grant equivalence (rather than cash face value). The OECD reports have also been criticised for the lack of transparency of information on mobilised private finance.
Beware the tempting apple of Ukraine mediation (Page no. 6)
(GS Paper 2, International Relations)
A recent report in a prominent American daily focussed on the possibility of India playing a significant role in seeking to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table.
The report came on the eve of the visit of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s to Moscow (November 7-8). It led to comment in the Indian media, both sober and exuberant, on how Indian diplomacy since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, had deftly put India in a position to promote peace between the warring parties.
For the ruling dispensation’s supporters, a mediatory Indian role in the Ukraine war would naturally serve as a great vindication of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s personal position as a world leader and his government’s successful handling of India’s external interests.
That Mr. Modi is drawing public attention to his efforts to advance India’s global status and reputation is clear from the enormous emphasis he is giving to India assuming the G20 presidency on December 1, 2022.
In a speech on November 8 to mark the release of the logo, theme and website of the Indian presidency, he said: “You can imagine what a big opportunity has come before the country in the ‘Amrit kal’ of Independence.
It is a matter of pride for every Indian; it is a matter of increasing one’s pride.” He went on to add, “…this summit is just not a diplomatic meeting. India sees this as a new responsibility for itself. India sees this as the world’s faith in itself.”
The question is whether he would consider the G20 presidency as a “new” responsibility to contribute to a resolution of the Ukraine conflict.
He may be actively encouraged to do so by the West. The idea, though seductive, is full of pitfalls. It would mark a departure from the cautious, and largely successful, approach that India has pursued till now on the Ukraine war.
India has made its disapproval of Russia’s action clear even if it has refrained from voting against it on substantive resolutions in United Nations forums, including the Security Council.
The maximum extent that India has gone to is of Mr. Modi openly telling Russian President Vladimir Putin in Samarkand (September 2022) that the present age was not one of war.
India has advocated a return to diplomacy and dialogue. India has intervened in specific cases with Russia such as to prevent it from endangering the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant (in Ukraine) or to allow the export of Ukraine foodgrains. But all these steps are far removed from attempts to mediate or bring the parties to the negotiating table.
If Mr. Modi or his advisers are tempted to accept western encouragement to go in the direction of mediation, they would do well to reflect on the lessons learnt by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in intervening with the Soviet leadership, at the prodding of the United States, to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Explainer
New regulations for awarding PhDs (Page no. 8)
(GS Paper 2, Education)
The University Grants Commission (UGC) has made sweeping changes in its latest regulations governing the award of PhDs. Important changes such as abolishing of MPhils, relaxing course work for obtaining PhDs and allowing candidates to register for a PhD after finishing four years of a graduation programme, have been seen as steps that could lead to diminishing academic rigour as well as impediments to inclusivity in higher education.
The UGC on November 7, 2022 notified the University Grants Commission (Minimum Standards and Procedures for Award of PhD Degree) Regulations, 2022.
One of the notable changes it made was to the evaluation and assessment criteria for the award of the degree, where it has waived the need to mandatorily publish a research paper in a peer-reviewed journal.
This is accompanied by completely abolishing MPhil, which has been a gateway for PhD programmes, in line with the recommendation in the National Education Policy 2020.
The eligibility criteria for admissions too have been revised, and a candidate can register after completing a one-year (or two semester) master’s degree programme after a four-year (or 8-semester) bachelor’s degree programme or a two-year (or four-semester) master’s degree programme after a three-year bachelor’s degree programme with at least 55% marks or its equivalent grade.
There are also important changes to course work. Earlier, the description of course work candidates needed to finish was more detailed, with at least four credits assigned to courses on research methodology.
Candidates were also required to finish this either in the first semester, or by the second semester. Only candidates who were awarded MPhil or had completed their MPhil were exempted.
But the new regulations leave it more open ended and says that all PhD scholars “shall be required to train in teaching/ education/ pedagogy/ writing related to their chosen PhD subject.”
They can also now be assigned 4-6 hours per week of teaching/research assistantship for conducting tutorial, or laboratory work and evaluations.
The UGC now also allows part-time PhDs, a practice that was disallowed under the 2009 and 2016 regulations.
Why has france ended military operations in sahel (Page no. 8)
(GS Paper 3, Defence)
On November 9, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the end of the decade-long Operation Barkhane in Africa. Mr. Macron said that, “Our military support for African countries will continue, but according to new principles that we have defined with them.”
France began its military operations in Sahel in January 2013. Titled Operation Serval, it was limited to targeting Islamic extremists linked to al-Qaeda who took control of northern Mali.
However, in 2014, the mission was scaled up, renamed Operation Barkhane and was aimed at counter-terrorism. The objective was to assist local armed forces to prevent the resurgence of non-state armed groups across the Sahel region. Around 4,500 French personnel were deployed with the local joint counter-terrorism force.
France has a mixed record in achieving its military objectives, with failures more evident than the successes. French operations had two objectives in the Sahel.
First, to liberate Mali from the insurgency in the north and second, to see through counter-terrorism operations in West Africa, including the neutralisation of key terrorists.
In its major successes, France regained Mali’s northern regions from the extremists in 2014 through Operation Serval. In 2020, Abdel Malek Droukdel and Bah Ag Moussa, key leaders of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaeda-affiliate Groupe de Soutien à l’Islam et aux Musulmans were killed in French-led operations.
The 2014 success led to the inception of Operation Barkhane aimed at counter-terrorism in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad. However, Operation Barkhane saw a series of failures.
First the region, despite the operation, witnessed the growth of new groups affiliated to terrorist organisations, including the Islamic State.
Second, the failure of the operation led to a humanitarian crisis. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the violence had claimed 5,450 lives across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in just the first half of 2022, recording a significant increase from the previous years.
Further, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies recorded 2,005 incidents of Islamist violence in the Sahel in 2021, compared to the 1,180 incidents in the previous year.
Third, Operation Barkhane’s unfulfilled objective to resolve the region’s insurgencies sparked an increase in civilian support to the military and has contributed to the subsequent political uncertainties in the Sahel.
Text & context
Are Data localisation requirements necessary and proportionate? (Page no. 9)
(GS Paper 3, IT and Computers)
The importance and use of data in today’s technology-driven world is immense. This is understood by both governments and businesses alike.
The cross-border data flow has proven to be an important pillar of strength for established as well as growing businesses. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in their Digital Economy Report found that businesses using the internet for global trade have a higher survival rate than those who do not.
Therefore, it becomes essential for economies [especially growing economies] to protect data during cross-border transfers. Countries mandate data that are created within their borders to remain stored within its territorial boundaries.
This process of storing data locally is referred to as data localisation. The emphasis on the requirement of data localisation has been pressing under the data protection laws of various countries, however with a varying magnitude.
The requirement of data localisation strengthens the protection of personal data, as all of us while using the internet are sending data in some manner or form.
For instance, obligations under the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), obligates businesses in the EU to keep the data secured within the boundaries of the EU.
If in any case such data are to be transferred to a different country, they need to have similar protections like those that exist in the EU. Countries like Russia on the other hand has stricter laws pertaining to the cross-border flow of data and emphasises keeping data within the Russian Federation.
What becomes important for us to understand here is that such strict measures may also demotivate businesses to operate in Russia and does not let neither the government nor the businesses cull-out the maximum potential that data could offer.
Keeping this in mind, post-Brexit, it was decided that most data could continue to flow from the EU and the European Economic Area without the need for additional safeguards to the U.K. but, in the case of ‘restricted transfers’, U.K. laws are mirrored as the GDPR.
One can, therefore, reasonably infer that the motive for different governments to store data locally is not only to protect the privacy of their citizens but also to exercise their control on the data, which is fuelling and driving businesses in their countries, for law enforcement purposes.
While governments try to reap the most by exploiting data to drive their economy, there are various other challenges that can shoot up due to non-uniform data localisation laws around the globe.
Another aspect related to this is the size of the population and subsequently the respective consumer markets. For an effective data localisation framework to be in place, the objectives undertaken by different governments need to be re-assessed to see if there tends to be a uniformity in the nature of data that different businesses operate and exploit.
News
Extra-regional fishing fleets present in Indian Ocean: Navy (Page no. 12)
(GS Paper 3, Economy)
More than 200 Chinese fishing vessels have been monitored in the Indian Ocean in the first half of this year, according to the Indian Navy, even as illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing continues to rise beyond India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Most of the illegal activity is found in the Northern Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
IUU fishing depletes fish stocks, destroys marine habitats, puts fishermen at disadvantage and impacts coastal communities, especially in developing countries.
Chinese fishing vessels, fishing vessels from European Union countries and other countries from outside the region were observed to be fishing in the Indian Ocean, the Navy said, in its written reply to queries.
The presence of extra-regional distant water fishing fleets has been monitored by Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC). Around 200-250 Chinese fishing vessels have been monitored in the Indian Ocean, with a large concentration in the Northern Indian Ocean, in its written response, without giving any details of specific occurrences. A total of 392 reported incidents of IUU fishing were monitored in 2021 compared to 379 in 2020 in the Indian Ocean.
As reported earlier, there has been a growing incidence of Chinese deep sea fishing trawlers in the Indian Ocean in addition to an overall rise of China’s maritime presence in the region. Incidentally, two Chinese research vessels which can track missile tests are also currently in the Indian Ocean region.
Chinese deep sea trawlers have been a matter of concern for countries in the region, including India, as they are operating far from the Chinese coast and impacting local marine ecology. For instance, between 2015 and 2019, on an average at least 500 Chinese deep sea trawlers were present in the IOR.
In a changing pattern, there is now a huge surge in unregistered Chinese fishing vessels among those operating in the IOR, it has been learnt.
An official in the know said that in the last couple of months, close to 140 Chinese fishing vessels have been monitored carrying out fishing beyond India’s EEZ, in the North Western IOR.
However, only approximately one-third of these had licenses for such activities, which borders on the lines of being categorised as IUU.
As per United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal nations are responsible for addressing IUU fishing issues within their respective EEZ.
There are regional fisheries management organisations such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement operating under the mandate of UNCLOS as regulatory bodies to monitor IUU fishing on the high seas.