India and the future of nuclear arms control (GS Paper 3, Science and Technology)
Context:
- As India commemorates 25 years of the Pokhran-II nuclear tests, nuclear weapons remain central to international politics.
- The ongoing Russian offensive against Ukraine witnessed the usage of nuclear threats by Russia, which outraged the world.
- The terrifying destructive capability of nuclear weapons has raised concerns and apprehensions with prolonged implications for world politics.
India and Arms Control:
- When India conducted the nuclear tests in 1998, great power competition had occupied centre stage with military force being used to revise territorial boundaries amidst coercive nuclear threats.
- Immediately after the conduct of the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, respectively, India promptly announced a voluntary moratorium on future nuclear tests.
- Thus, India an important measure of assurance to the world that it will refrain from further nuclear tests unless, of course, its national interests are imperilled.
- The rationale behind India’s position was to minimise the risks and inherent costs of an arms competition and to improve strategic stability. This limits the possibility of a nuclear war, which neither side wants.
- The objectives of arms control were “to improve the inherent stability of the situation” and mitigate the causes of war.
India & arms control measures:
- Since Independence, India has been an ardent advocate for arms control and disarmament. India was the first country to propose a nuclear test ban treaty and a cut-off on the production of materials for nuclear weapons.
- In 1963, India signed and ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty that called for a ban on atmospheric, outer space, and underwater nuclear explosions.
- However, discriminatory nuclear politics over the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the lack of commitment of the nuclear weapon states to Article VI of the NPT proved to be setback for India’s unconditional support to arms control measures.
No-First-Use (NFU):
- Following the 1998 nuclear tests, India, in the draft nuclear doctrine of 1999 unconditionally upheld the policy of No-First-Use (NFU).
- In 2003, India reiterated its official doctrinal position on the NFU policy. India’s NFU policy dates back to 1994, when it extended an agreement on “no-first-use of nuclear capability” to Pakistan.
- Regrettably, the difficult experiences of the Cold War era did not evoke meaningful lessons and a bilateral NFU treaty could not be implemented between the South Asian neighbours.
China’s reluctance:
- Expanding the geographical expanse to Southern Asia, India and China are nuclear neighbours with unstable relations over border revisions since the 1950s.
- China has refused to acknowledge India’s nuclear weapons status and, hence, has been largely reluctant to enter into any nuclear arms control measures.
Need for Arms control in South Asia:
- Southern Asia is at the centre of complex nuclear politics. India faces two nuclear neighbours with adversarial relations with whom India has fought conventional wars and is fighting a protracted sub-conventional war under the nuclear umbrella.
- Given this hostile environment, the region urgently requires effective nuclear arms control as a tool for ensuring nuclear stability, nuclear-risk-reduction, and increased nuclear confidence-building measures.
- There is a difference in perception on the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. In India, the perception is that Pakistan will not resort to nuclear offense for fear of retaliation. Hence, Pakistan can be engaged in conventional and sub-conventional conflicts.
- Also, since Pakistan does not have a codified nuclear doctrine specifying their nuclear redlines, there remain several assumptions about the circumstances under which a nuclear war may unfold. While this may be apt for purposes of nuclear deterrence, it also significantly increases nuclear risks.
- In the past, there have been a few instances of nuclear intimidation from Pakistan that have severely corroded strategic security and stability.
- The rapid modernisation of the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and their close nuclear nexus raises serious concerns among Indian strategic and security elites.
Way Forward:
- Nuclear-armed states, being possessors of the most lethal weapons, have a responsibility to act with restraint. India has been consistently restrained in its nuclear posture and upheld the rules and norms of the non-proliferation regime.
- As a responsible nuclear power, India may consider taking the initiative to extend confidence-building measures that are beneficial to and worth achieving for all the nuclear weapons states in the region.
- This can involve efforts for a trilateral forum comprising India, Pakistan, and China, wherein, issues pertaining to ballistic missile defence system, development of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) technology, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) can be discussed.
- The CTBT is a relevant tool for banning future nuclear testing and hence an effective arms control measure.
- The FMCT proscribes future production of fissile material, which is of urgent necessity to restrain the rapidly expanding arsenals of nuclear-capable states like Pakistan and China.
