India and the SCO paradox (GS Paper 2, International Relation)
Context:
- The visit of Chinese and Russian defence ministers to attend a ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Delhi is drawing much attention.
Details:
- India, which is chairing the Eurasian regional forum in 2023, will have a range of bilateral problems to discuss with its fellow SCO members.
- These include the disengagement and de-escalation of the border confrontation with China and Russia’s supply of spares to the large inventory of Russian arms amidst the war in Ukraine.
Contradictions:
- If the main objective of the SCO was to promote peace in Eurasia, its ability to cope with the intra-state and inter-state conflicts among the member states is now under scrutiny.
- To make matters more complicated, Russia’s war in Ukraine is raising questions about Moscow’s capacity to sustain primacy in its backyard. Meanwhile, China’s rise is increasing the prospects for it’s emergence as the dominant force in inner Asia.
Expansion of NATO vs SCO:
- If clamour for membership is a measure of a forum’s success, the SCO is doing well.
- Many countries in Central Europe, including Ukraine, want to follow Finland and Sweden into North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
- Several important regional states in India’s neighbourhood are queuing up to join the SCO, which now has eight members – China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
- Iran is set to join the SCO and Afghanistan, Belarus, and Mongolia are observers and would like to follow Iran. Then there is the impressive list of current and incipient dialogue partners that includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates from the Middle East and Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka from the Subcontinent.
- Unlike NATO, the SCO is inclusive, and its attractiveness underlines the rise of non-Western security institutions. That Turkey, a long-standing member of NATO, wants to be part of SCO certainly highlights the value of being part of a forum led by Russia and China that today are at loggerheads with the West.
Counter-terrorism:
- The counter-terrorism has been the principal preoccupation of the SCO all these years.
- This is not surprising given the urgent need to cope with the dramatic rise of violent religious extremism in the closing years of the 20th century and its spectacular manifestation at the dawn of the 21st in the form of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.
Resolving conflicts:
- Preventing conflict within and between the member states and associates is now becoming a higher priority for the SCO.
- But the forum’s record here is not impressive. Consider, for example, Afghanistan whose internal instabilities have been a major driver for the SCO. For all the talk of the SCO becoming the regional security arbiter, it was a direct deal between the US and the Taliban that reshaped the Afghan dynamic.
- In January 2022, when there was a major internal upheaval in Kazakhstan it was not the SCO that rode to the rescue; it was the Russian army that intervened to stabilise the situation. But Russia’s war against Ukraine a few weeks later has sent a shiver down the spine of former Russian republics.
Protector & potential predator:
- If Russia is a protector of the Central Asian regimes, it could also be a potential predator. Russian leaders have often dismissed Central Asian states as artificial nations.
- President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a “Russkiy Mir” or the Russian world underlines its’s special responsibility to protect Russian minorities beyond its formal borders. Unsurprisingly, no Central Asian neighbour has endorsed the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- To be sure, Russia is deeply entrenched within the Central Asian state system with strong ties to local elites and security establishments.
- Many Central Asians work in Russia and send valuable remittances home. Yet after Ukraine, the Central Asian states are looking to intensify their diversification strategies to reduce their reliance on Russia.
India’s challenge:
- Akin to India’s “multi-alignment”, Kazakhs for example, talk about “multi-vector diplomacy”. Not every one of the Central Asian states is able to pursue this strategy as vigorously as Kazakhstan.
- Meanwhile, there is no shortage of regional actors seeking to expand their influence in Russia’s backyard. Turkey and Iran are two prime examples.
- But it is the Central Asian role of a rising China that should draw the attention of the Indian strategic community.
Conclusion & Way Forward:
- Some observers argue that China’s growing regional influence will come at Russia’s expense, as China becomes the senior partner in the bilateral relationship with Russia after Ukraine.
- Others point to the fact that Russia and China have drawn closer than ever before and that they have little reason to quarrel over Central Asia.
- Russia’s muscle and China’s money provide a sensible basis for their strategic division of labour in Central Asia to keep the Western powers out of the region.
