Daily Current Affairs

ATAGS, the indigenous howitzer used in Independence Day 21-gun salute (GS Paper 3, Defence)

Why in news?

• In a first, an indigenously developed howitzer gun, ATAG, became part of the 21-gun salute during the Independence Day ceremony at the Red Fort.
• Developed by the DRDO, the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) was used alongside the traditional British- origin ’25 Pounders’ artillery guns.

 

The 21-gun salute tradition:

• When the National Anthem is played by the Military Band after the unfurling of the Tricolour at the Red Fort by the Prime Minister, a 21-volley gun salute is fired by a ceremonial battery from an artillery regiment.
• The tradition of gun salutes originates from the Western navies where guns from the ports and those from incoming ships used to be fired in a particular manner to convey that there was no belligerent intention. This tradition was carried forward as a way of paying respects or for according official welcome to the Crown, royals, military commanders and heads of states.
• India inherited the tradition from the British rulers who had gun salutes comprising 101 volleys, 31 volleys and 21 volleys, and so on depending on the hierarchy.
• In India, artillery gun salutes are fired on the Republic Day, the Independence Day and also at the time of oath taking ceremony of the President, among other occasions.
• Over the years, this 21-gun salute was fired by the World War era howitzers of British make known as ‘Ordnance Quick Fire 25 Pounder’ or just ’25 Pounder’.

 

Inclusion of ATAGS:

• In 2022, two Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) howitzers joined the battery that fired along with other 25 Pounders, officials have said.
• The ATAGS is an indigenous 155 mm x 52 calibre howitzer gun developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) with its Pune-based facility Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) being the nodal agency.
• Howitzers is an umbrella term for a category of long-range artillery guns. Some practice firing sessions of the ATAGS were held in the run up to the Independence Day celebrations.
• Including the ATAGS in the symbolic activity of 21-gun salute is a crucial step in the journey and is significant towards its induction into the Army.
• The ATAGS project was started in 2013 by DRDO to replace older guns in service in the Indian Army with a modern 155 mm artillery gun.

 

ATAGS features:

• The armament system of ATAGS mainly comprises barrel, breech mechanism, muzzle brake and recoil mechanism to fire 155 mm calibre ammunition held by Army with a longer range, accuracy and precision and provides greater firepower.
• The ATAGS is configured with all electric drive to ensure maintenance free and reliable operation over a longer period of time.
• It has advanced features in terms of high mobility, quick deployability, auxiliary power mode, advanced communication system, automatic command and control system with night firing capability in the direct fire mode.
• The specialised gun system is compatible with C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems like the Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS) called Shakti for technical fire control, fire planning, deployment management, and operational logistics management of the Army.

 

Future role:

• The development process of ATAGS by the DRDO coincides with development of Howitzer Dhanush for Advanced Weapons and Equipment India of the erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board.
• In 2019, the Army and the Ministry of Defence gave bulk production clearance to produce 114 Dhanush.
• The two flagship products under Make in India;  ATAGS and Dhanush will successfully replace the older systems from the artillery in coming days.

 

60 years of diplomatic relations with the European Union (EU)

(GS Paper 2, International Relation)

 

Context:

• While India celebrates its 75th year of Independence, it also celebrates 60 years of diplomatic relations with the European Union (EU).

Timeline:

• A cooperation agreement signed in 1994 took the bilateral relationship beyond trade and economic cooperation. The first India-EU Summit, in June 2000, marked a watershed in the evolution of the relationship.
• At the fifth India-EU Summit in 2004, the relationship was upgraded to a ‘Strategic Partnership’.
• The two sides adopted a Joint Action Plan in 2005 towards strengthening dialogue and consultation mechanisms in the political and economic spheres, enhancing trade and investment, and bringing peoples and cultures together.

 

15th India-EU Summit:

• The 15th India-EU Summit, in July 2020, provided a common road map to guide joint action and further strengthen the partnership over the next five years.
• The road map highlights engagement across five domains: foreign policy and security cooperation; trade and economy; sustainable modernisation partnership; global governance; and people-to-people relations.

 

Areas of cooperation:

• Bilateral trade between the two surpassed $116 billion in 2021-22. The EU is India’s second largest trading partner after the U.S., and the second largest destination for Indian exports.
• There are 6,000 European companies in the country that directly and indirectly create 6.7 million jobs. Beyond the economic partnership, India and the EU have several avenues of collaboration.
• For example, the ‘green strategic partnership’ between India and Denmark aims to address climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, and the India-Nordic Summit in May focused on green technologies and industry transformation that are vital for sustainable and inclusive growth. All this will act as a catalyst for enhanced cooperation between the two regions.

 

Defence sector:

• Cooperation with the EU in the defence sector has also increased substantially. This is critical for India at this juncture, to reduce its hardware dependence on Russia in the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict and seek diversification of its armament imports from other regions with latest technologies in wake of its confrontation with China.
• India and the EU regularly conduct joint military and naval exercises which reflects on their commitment to a free, open, inclusive and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
• The first maritime security dialogue between the two in 2021 focused on cooperation in maritime domain awareness, capacity-building, and joint naval activities.
• France’s on-time delivery of 36 Rafale fighter jets and willingness to offer Barracuda nuclear attack submarines to the Indian Navy reflects the growing level of trust in their relationships.
• Leading European defence equipment manufacturers are willing to partner with Indian companies for defence projects aligned with the ‘Make in India’ programme.

 

Innovation ecosystem:

• Another rapidly growing area of engagement is the start-up and innovation ecosystem across India and Europe. Furthermore, the Science and Technology Joint Steering Committee between the two focus on areas such as healthcare, Artificial Intelligence, and earth sciences.
• In 2020, there was an agreement for research and development cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Government of India.

 

Challenges:

Russia:

• Both have differing opinions and divergent interests in some areas. India’s reluctance to explicitly condemn Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, and the country’s increasing economic cooperation with Russia, has been one area of disagreement.
• India has called out the EU’s double standards on the same, for the EU purchases 45% of its gas imports from Russia in 2021.

 

China:

• There is also ambiguity on the EU’s strategy in tackling the rise of China. Its muted response during the Galwan clash is a case in point.
• India’s economic, political and demographic weight could be deftly leveraged by the EU to counterbalance China’s influence across the region. But there seems to be some hesitancy about this.

 

Way Forward:

• India and the EU should not let such divergences of views overwhelm the many areas of convergence among them. The proactive resumption of the ambitious India-EU free trade and investment agreement in 2021 is a step in the right direction.
• European partners acknowledge India as an important pillar in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU wants to be more than just a trading bloc and is seeking alliances with like-minded countries like India.

 

Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh

(GS Paper 2, International Relation)

Context:

• The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has been at the centre of three major wars and multiple clashes for decades.
• The recent flare-up began after Azerbaijan claimed that it had captured the territory in Karabakh in a retaliatory campaign, after an Armenian attack killed one Azerbaijani soldier. 

 

Details:

• The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains stalemated despite the several ceasefire agreements reached in the past. Both Baku and Yerevan claim absolute historic ownership of the region which is located within the boundaries of Azerbaijan but is populated largely by ethnic Armenians.
• Following Azerbaijan’s announcement of capturing Karabakh, the military in Nagorno-Karabakh disputed the claim and accused Azerbaijan of killing two soldiers, declaring a “partial mobilisation” in response to the clash.
• Armenia has called on the international community to help stop Azerbaijan’s “aggressive actions” claiming that it continues its “policy of terror” against the population of Nagorno-Karabakh.
• Russia has also accused Azerbaijan of breaking the ceasefire agreement of 2020 and claimed that it was “taking measures to stabilise the situation” with Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives.

 

What does the 2020 agreement say?

• The nine-point agreement of November 10, 2020 was signed by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• The agreement imposed an immediate ceasefire, a timeline for withdrawal from Azerbaijan’s occupied regions, the introduction of Russian peacekeepers, and the need for new transport corridors.
• However, this failed to initiate a peace agreement because it altered the power balance between the two countries and lacked clarity on several issues resulting in the subsequent ceasefire violations on both sides.

 

Why are ceasefire agreements not working?

• The recurring ceasefire violations have been triggered due to several unresolved issues. The major issues include delimiting the border between the two countries, the nature of new transportation corridors in the region, and the future of Nagorno-Karabakh and its current ethnic Armenian population.

 

Border issue:

• First, the issue of delineating the shared international border. Following the 2020 agreement, a substantial amount of territory was handed over from Armenian Karabakh to Azerbaijan making the once soft border between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a hard international border.
• However, Armenia and Azerbaijan have never agreed upon a boundary between them in the past and the 2020 ceasefire statement did not make it clear on how exactly the border should be drawn out.

 

Transport routes:

• The overland route that goes from Stepanakert (a city within the Nagorno-Karabakh region) to Armenia has become an issue between the two countries.
• The 2020 agreement states that the parties should build an alternative road within three years, after which the Russian peacekeepers deployed along the current route would relocate to the new one.
• Presently, there is only one road which is the Lachin corridor, which runs past the outposts through Azerbaijan’s mountainous Lachin region to Shusha, which Azerbaijani forces retook in the 2020 war.
• The construction of the road would allow Azerbaijan to take back control of Lachin city and surrounding areas. However, Azerbaijan has accused Armenia of stalling operations of laying its several-kilometre section of the new road.

 

Status of Nagorno-Karabakh:

• The ethnically Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is also known as the Republic of Artsakh, has expressed frustration over Armenia’s willingness to make concessions to Azerbaijan as part of a larger prospective peace settlement. While Armenia supports the aspirations for independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan seeks to preserve its national and territorial integrity.
• According to the 2020 agreement, point one claims that the parties to the conflict must “stop in their current positions” while point four states that the Russian peacekeeping forces would be deployed concurrently with the withdrawal of the Armenian troops.
• However, the two sides interpret these points differently with Armenia stating that the first point allows them to keep their forces in Karabakh and that they have complied with the fourth point by withdrawing armed forces from the seven Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh.
• Conversely, Azerbaijan says that Armenian forces should have withdrawn from Karabakh as soon as the Russians were deployed on the ground, arguing that the force is illegal and has urged the Russian peacekeepers to disarm it.

 

Exchange of prisoners:

• According to the eighth point, the two sides were to exchange prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons, and dead bodies.
• While there has been a series of prisoner exchanges in the last two years, the Azerbaijan side still has many captives while Armenia has just a few.

 

What is Russia’s role?

• The presence of Russian peacekeeping forces in the region has also become a matter of concern.
• According to the 2020 agreement, the Russian peacekeeping forces are to be deployed for five years making it the first time Russian troops were deployed on the ground in almost thirty years. However, their mandate is yet to be defined, questioning their presence in the region.
• Additionally, the frustration over the peacekeeping forces has intensified due to their inaction in stopping ceasefire violations.

 

Will the ceasefire hold?

• While the 2020 agreement has the potential to open opportunities for new transport connections and economic cooperation, the discord between Armenia and Azerbaijan would hinder this process. Further, the agreement has been criticised for being biased.
• Apart from this, the agreement also fails to address unresolved issues between the two countries. Thus, until these lacunae are filled the recurring ceasefire violations are likely to continue.

 

Diplomacy for Viksit Bharat

(GS Paper 2, International Relation)

Context:

• The new ambition outlined by Prime Minister to make India a developed country, “Viksit Bharat”, by 2047 will demand significant changes in Indian foreign policy tradition.
• Some of those changes, already set in motion in recent years, must now acquire greater purpose and speed.

 

Time for new foreign policy strategies:

• Indian diplomatic discourse remains trapped in a framework that emerged when India was weak and vulnerable 75 years ago. The fears of a “developing nation” can’t be the guiding principles for the diplomacy of a “developed nation”. Your global perspectives must necessarily change when you move from the bottom of the scrum and to the top of the heap.
• While the geographic imperatives of a nation endure over time, the changing nature of the Indian economy, evolution of external conditions, emergence of new regional challenges, and shifts in the global power hierarchy all demand new foreign policy strategies.
• While India is well on its way to becoming the third-largest economy in the next few years, that does not necessarily make it a developed nation.
• Many of the tasks of becoming a developed nation are indeed domestic, promoting social justice, internal unity, economic modernisation, resilient political institutions, and deep bases of science and technology.

 

Three major foreign policy tasks:

Resolving border issues:

• The first is the need to overcome the residual legacies of Partition that continue to undermine India’s geopolitical position. Resolving the problems left over by Partition on India’s northwestern frontier looks quite hard despite the efforts by successive PMs in the last three decades.
• Deterring the dangers from across the Western frontier must remain a major priority until Pakistan is ready for a productive relationship with India.
• Meanwhile, India must continue to build on the recent good work in overcoming the bitter legacies of Partition in the east, including the settlement of the boundary dispute with Bangladesh.

 

Strengthening regional and trans-regional institutions:

• If Partition weakened India, Delhi struggled to retain the regional primacy it had inherited from the British Raj in the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. The reclaiming of a prominent role for India in the region can’t be by fiat, but by making cooperation with India more attractive to the neighbouring elites in the Subcontinent and beyond.
• The initiatives of the last few years on intensifying connectivity, trade ties, and security partnerships with the neighbours will need a sustained push in the coming years. India also needs to double down on strengthening regional and trans-regional institutions.
• As the world’s third- largest economy that wants to be a developed state, India must look beyond the immediate neighbourhood to more effectively engage with Africa, Latin America and Oceania where India’s footprint remains light, despite some recent initiatives.

 

Dominance of China:

• The second is about coping with the growing power gap with China. China has been the greatest beneficiary of India’s Partition. China unified itself after an extended civil war in 1949 just after India chose to be divided in 1947.
• China has leveraged the divisions within the Subcontinent to constrain India. India’s ability to raise its level of engagement in the extended neighbourhood and beyond also runs into substantive Chinese presence.
• India has compounded that problem over the decades by persistent romanticism about China and overestimating the potential for collaboration with China, whether it was Nehru’s notion of an “area of peace” in Asia or the pursuit of a “multipolar world” since the 1990s in partnership with China.
• The first came crashing down in 1962 and the second now confronts the nightmare of a “unipolar Asia” dominated by an assertive China. To make matters worse, the Chinese military can choose its time and place today to raise the military temperature on the disputed Sino-Indian border as it has done in 2013, 2014, 2017, and 2020.

Engagement with major powers:

• All the policies outlined by the Modi government to address the China challenge, securing our frontiers, retaining India’s regional position, strengthening India’s manufacturing sector, improving domestic technological capabilities, and producing more weapons at home, leads to the third task.
• It is about building stronger partnerships with other major powers. But collaboration with other great powers has been hobbled by old ideas of “non-alignment” and “strategic autonomy”.
• All countries practice strategic autonomy to the extent they can; it is not a special characteristic of Indian diplomacy. India’s problem as it becomes the third-largest economy is not about seeking autonomy from other powers, but joining them in shaping a stable balance of power system in the world.
• This might involve both competing and collaborating with other major powers,  sometimes doing both at the same time. Building partnerships is not ceding ground to other powers, but negotiating mutually beneficial terms in dealing with complex problems.
• While much of the domestic debate on India’s Ukraine policy has been rooted in the familiar framework of “external pressures”, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Imran Khan, has praised India’s successful pursuit of its own interests.
• If India can do this with a $3-trillion economy, its ability to engage the other powers can only improve along with the growth of its comprehensive national power.

 

Way Forward:

• Becoming the third largest economy and a developed society can’t just be about geopolitics and balance of power. It is also about global leadership in managing the enormous consequences of the unfolding technological revolution, stabilising the economic order, and addressing the challenges of climate change and pandemics.
• The uncritical acceptance of globalisation in the early 21st century has created economic problems of its own.
• On its way to 2047, India will have to temper its soaring universalism with geopolitical sensitivity and combine the pursuit of multilateralism  at the UN, G-20, and WTO with coalitions of like-minded nations. Getting power and principle to reinforce each other will help herald India’s arrival as a developed nation and a major power.